Passport Certifications and Exceptions

IRC 7345


The U.S. Tax Court in Shaban v. Comm’r filed March 3, 2026 at T.C. Memo 2026-24 provides a good overview of what it means to be certified as a seriously delinquent taxpayer for passport purposes, and exceptions for that certification.  The taxpayer in this matter was nothing but a victim to his own brother’s embezzlement, which approximated $9 million.  Unfortunately, this included trust fund money for payroll taxes.  Since the taxpayer was the owner of the business, he was assessed with the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty, or TFRP. The taxpayer took advantage of the opportunity to protest the proposed TFRP penalty, but his representative failed to timely respond to requests for information and the assessment stuck.  Ultimately, he was certified by the Department of Treasury to the Department of State as seriously delinquent and his passport was affected.  The taxpayer’s goal was to attack the certification through the argument that he was a victim of ID Theft.  The Court reflected on their limited jurisdiction as defined by the relevant statute – IRC 7345. That statute only allows the Court to determine if the certification was erroneous, or if the IRS failed to reverse the certification when required to do so.  It is noteworthy to explore the exceptions to the definition of “seriously delinquent tax debt,” according to the statute.  Those exceptions are debt that is under the statutory amount ($66,000 for 2026), debt paid pursuant to an installment agreement, or an Offer in Compromise.  In addition, a taxpayer can be placed in Currently Not Collectible status. Or, a debt where collection is suspended because of a request for collection due process hearing, or request for innocent spouse relief. It is also feasible for an administrative claim of ID theft approved by the IRS, to remove the liability from qualifying as a seriously delinquent tax debt.  One would think given the taxpayer’s arguments that he was the victim of ID theft that he would have pursued the filing of Form 14039 Identity Theft Affidavit, for processing at the IRS.  He did not, and because of that, along with the inability to substantiate any other exception under the statute, the certification was deemed proper.  The take-away here is that establishment of a collection alternative, and other actions, can result in decertification for passport purposes, even if the debt is not paid in full. 

Trust Fund Recovery Penalty—Assessment Statute

IRC 6501

The United States District Court in Dawn D. Lagerkvist v. USA, 2024 WL 869548, N.D. Indiana, signed February 29, 2024, ruled in favor of the Government on its Motion for Summary Judgment and against the taxpayer’s argument that the statute of limitations for assessment of the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP) had expired. In this case, upon application for a tax id number, the taxpayer advised the IRS that it was qualified to file a Form 944, rather than a Form 941 for its beginning tax year of 2012.  In reality, the taxpayer attempted to file a 1st Quarter Form 941 in early 2012 that was rejected in a return letter by the IRS. The taxpayer was advised it must change its filing to 941’s by proper request, or file a timely Form 944 annually. The taxpayer did neither, but in this case argues that the statute of limitations for collection of the TFRP has expired.  The law in Section 6501 states that the IRS is required to assess a tax within 3 years after the return was filed. If the taxpayer fails to file a return, the IRS may assess the tax (TFRP in this instance) at any time.  In other words, no return, no statute on assessment. The taxpayer argued that there was a dispute as to whether or not she actually filed the returns because she provided employee testimony that all filings were handled the same way. She argued the attempted filing of the First Quarter 941, along with other documents, such as her filed 1120-S, W-2s and W-2, should be sufficient to meet her annual return filing requirements and therefore the TFRP assessment was untimely. For multiple reasons, and through several pages of analysis, the Court rejected this premise as not only undermining the statute, but also imposing an unworkable administrative burden on the IRS.